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Plaintiff Nimesh Patel, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, through 
undersigned counsel, brings this Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Illinois Biometric 
Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq., against defendant Facebook, Inc. 
(“Facebook”), and alleges the following upon information and belief, except as to the allegations 
within plaintiff’s personal knowledge.  Plaintiff believes that substantial additional evidentiary 
support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. 
SUMMARY OF THE ACTION 
1. Facebook is the largest social network in the United States and likely the world.  
Facebook has previously been alleged to abuse consumers’ privacy rights.1  Plaintiff brings this class 
action to put an end to Facebook’s latest privacy abuse – its collection, storage, and subsequent use 
of its users’ biometric identifiers and biometric information without informed consent, in direct 
contravention of the BIPA. 
2. Biometric information is any information captured, converted, stored or shared based 
on a person’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.  A “biometric identifier” is any 
personal feature that is unique to an individual, including fingerprints, iris scans, DNA, “face 
geometry” (also referred to herein as “faceprint” or “facial features”) and voice, among others.  
Biometric identification is the way of the future.  The City of Chicago has been selected by major 
national corporations as a “pilot testing site[] for new applications of biometric-facilitated financial 
transactions, including finger-scan technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school 
cafeterias.”  740 ILCS 14/5(b). 
3. The Illinois Legislature has found that “[b]iometrics are unlike other unique 
identifiers that are used to access finances or other sensitive information.”  740 ILCS 14/5(c).  “For 
                                                 
1 See https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/facebook_and_facial_recognitio.html (last visited May 12, 
2015). 
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example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed.  Biometrics, however, are 
biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is 
at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated 
transactions.”  Id. 
4. In recognition of this legitimate concern over the security of biometric information, 
the Illinois Legislature enacted the BIPA, which provides, inter alia, that private entities like 
Facebook may not obtain a person’s biometric information in any way unless it first: (1) informs that 
person in writing that biometric information will be collected or stored; (2) informs that person in 
writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which such biometric information is being 
collected, stored and used; and (3) receives a written release from the person for the collection of his 
or her biometric information.  See 740 ILCS 14/15(b).   
5. In direct violation of all three prongs of §15(b) of the BIPA, Facebook is actively 
collecting, storing, and using the biometric information of its reportedly more than one billion users 
without any written notice or informed written consent, including millions of Illinois residents.   
6. Specifically, sometime in late 2010, Facebook began implementing its “tag 
suggestion” feature (“Tag Suggestions”), which utilizes sophisticated facial recognition software to 
automatically match pictures with names.2  Facebook’s software collects, analyzes and compares the 
facial features in user-uploaded photographs and saves what is known as a “face template” in 
Facebook’s database.  When a user uploads a photograph, Facebook’s Tag Suggestions compares the 
faces of any individual in that photograph to the face templates in the Facebook database.  If there is 
a match, Facebook suggests that the user “tag” the person in the photograph with the appropriate 
                                                 
2  See https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/making-photo-tagging-easier/467145887130 (last 
visited May 12, 2015). 
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name.  Facebook’s facial template database is so large that it dwarfs the FBI’s.3  Indeed, at a hearing 
before the U.S. Senate on Capitol Hill in 2012, Senator Al Franken described Facebook as the 
“world’s largest privately held database of face prints – without the explicit consent of its users.”4 
7. Indeed, Facebook never gave its members notice that their biometric information 
would be collected, stored or used, nor did Facebook inform its users of the specific purpose and 
length of term for which their biometric information would be collected, stored and used.  Rather, 
Facebook announced that it was collecting such data only after it had already begun doing so.  
Facebook also never received a written release from its members for the collection, storage and use 
of their biometric information.  Indeed, Facebook members are not even given an opportunity to 
provide a written release because Facebook enables Tag Suggestions on its users’ accounts by 
default. 
8. Facebook’s collection, storage and use of its members’ biometric information has 
been the subject of a hearing before the U.S. Senate, and European regulators forced Facebook to 
pull Tag Suggestions.   
9. Moreover, §15(a) of the BIPA provides that: 
A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must 
develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention 
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and 
biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such 
identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last 
interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first. 
                                                 
3 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/10/17/the-biometrics-revolution-is-
already-here-and-you-may-not-be-ready-for-it/ (last visited May 12, 2015). 
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/technology/facebook-backs-down-on-face-recognition-in-
europe.html?_r=0 (last visited May 12, 2015). 
Case: 1:15-cv-04265 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/14/15 Page 5 of 20 PageID #:5
 - 4 - 
740 ILCS 14/15(a).  Facebook does not provide its users with a publicly available retention schedule 
or guidelines for permanently destroying their biometric information as required by the BIPA.  
Therefore, defendant has also violated §15(a) of the BIPA. 
10. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of a proposed class in order to 
stop Facebook’s violations of the BIPA and to recover statuary damages for the unauthorized 
collection, storage and use of their biometric information in violation of the BIPA.   
PARTIES 
11. Plaintiff Nimesh Patel is, and has been at all relevant times, a resident and citizen of 
the state of Illinois and a resident of Cook County, Illinois.  Plaintiff has been a Facebook user since 
at least 2009. 
12. Defendant Facebook is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters and principal 
executive offices at 1601 Willow Road, Menlo Park, California 94025.   Facebook is a citizen of the 
states of Delaware and California.  Facebook is also registered to conduct business in the State of 
Illinois (file number 66267067) and maintains an office in Cook County. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
13. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1332 in that plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy 
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs. 
14. Jurisdiction is also proper in this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 
U.S.C. §1332(d) (“CAFA”), because: (i) the proposed class consists of well over 100 members; (ii) 
the parties are minimally diverse, as members of the proposed class, including plaintiff, are citizens 
of a state different from defendant’s home states; and (iii) the aggregate amount in controversy 
exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs.  It was reported that as of 2010, there were 
millions of Facebook users in Illinois.  The estimated number of Illinois Facebook users impacted by 
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defendant’s conduct multiplied by BIPA’s statutory liquidated damages figure ($5,000 for each 
intentional or reckless violation and $1,000 for each negligent violation) easily exceeds CAFA’s 
$5,000,000 threshold. 
15. Venue is proper in this District because defendant is registered to conduct business in 
Illinois, conducts business transactions in this District, and the causes of action arose, in substantial 
part, in this District.  Venue is additionally proper because plaintiff resides in this District.  
SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS 
Biometric Information and the Illinois BIPA 
16. A “biometric identifier” is any personal feature that is unique to an individual, 
including fingerprints, iris scans, DNA, facial features and voice, among others.5   
17. The Illinois Legislature has found that “[b]iometrics are unlike other unique 
identifiers that are used to access finances or other sensitive information.”  740 ILCS 14/5(c).  “For 
example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed.  Biometrics, however, are 
biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is 
at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated 
transactions.”  Id.   
18. In recognition of this legitimate concern over the security of biometric information, 
the Illinois Legislature enacted the BIPA, which provides, inter alia, that: 
No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise 
obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information, 
unless it first:  
                                                 
5  The BIPA defines “biometric information” as “any information, regardless of how it is captured, 
converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.  
Biometric information does not include information derived from items or procedures excluded under the 
definition of biometric identifiers.”  740 ILCS 14/10.  Plaintiff herein uses the terms “biometric information” 
and “biometric identifier” interchangeably. 
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(1) informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative 
in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or 
stored;  
(2) informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative 
in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier 
or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and  
(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric 
identifier or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized representative. 
740 ILCS 14/15(b). 
19. Section 15(a) of the BIPA further provides that:  
A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must 
develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention 
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and 
biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such 
identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last 
interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first. 
740 ILCS 14/15(a). 
20. As alleged herein, Facebook’s practices of collecting, storing and using its members’ 
biometric information without informed written consent violates all three prongs of §15(b) of the 
BIPA.  Facebook’s failure to provide a publicly available written policy regarding its schedule and 
guidelines for the retention and permanent destruction of its users’ biometric information violates 
§15(a) of the BIPA. 
Facebook Collects and Stores Members’ Biometric 
Information Without Informed Consent   
21. Facebook operates the largest online social network in the world with five new 
profiles being created every second and over one billion users and millions of users in Illinois alone. 
22. The Facebook network allows its members to create a “profile” page where members 
can upload photographs and communicate and interact with other Facebook members who also 
upload photographs to their own profiles.  Member photographs have always been a vital part of the 
Facebook experience, with Facebook members uploading approximately 300 million photos per day. 
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23. Facebook allows its members to “tag” themselves and other members who appear in a 
user-uploaded photograph.  A tag identifies each person in a photograph and also acts as a hyperlink 
to that person’s profile, which may display more photographs of that person, thereby increasing user 
engagement.  This basic “tagging” feature has existed since the early days of Facebook. 
24. On or about December 15, 2010, Facebook announced an upcoming new feature 
called Tag Suggestions.6  Tag Suggestions took photo tagging one step further by utilizing 
sophisticated facial recognition software to automatically match photographs of people with their 
proper names. 
25. Facebook’s sophisticated facial recognition technology works by collecting and 
analyzing the facial features of individuals appearing in a user-uploaded photograph and generating a 
“biometric signature” or “face template” of each individual’s face.  Facebook stores those face 
templates in a large database (which dwarfs the FBI’s facial recognition database), and as Facebook 
members continue to manually tag friends, family and other people they recognize in a photograph, 
Facebook’s software automatically compares those images to the face templates in its database.  If 
there is a match, Facebook suggests that a user tag the photograph with the appropriate name. 
26. Facebook’s Tag Suggestions collects, stores, and uses its members’ biometric 
information without notice and without informed written consent, in violation of all three prongs of 
§15(b) of the BIPA. 
27. First, in direct contravention of §15(b) of the BIPA, Facebook never informed its 
members that it would collect, store and use their biometric facial information.  Rather, on or about 
June 7, 2011, Facebook simply announced that it was collecting such biometric information after it 
                                                 
6  https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/making-photo-tagging-easier/467145887130 (last visited 
May 12, 2015). 
Case: 1:15-cv-04265 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/14/15 Page 9 of 20 PageID #:9
 - 8 - 
had already begun doing so.7  To be sure, Facebook later admitted that “we should have been more 
clear during the roll-out process when this [feature] became available.”8 
28. Second, in direct contravention of §15(b) of the BIPA, Facebook never informed its 
users of the specific purpose and length of term for which their biometric information would be 
collected, stored and used.  
29. Third, in direct contravention of §15(b) of the BIPA, Facebook never received a 
written release from its members before it began to collect, store and use their biometric information.  
Indeed, Facebook members are not even given an opportunity to provide a written release because 
Facebook enables Tag Suggestions on its users’ accounts by default.  By contrast, some of 
Facebook’s other features, like its “Nearby Friends” feature, which utilizes geolocation to identify a 
user’s friends who may be nearby, provides users with several screens of information regarding the 
feature before asking the member to opt in. 
30. These issues were the subject of a U.S. Senate hearing in 2012 where Minnesota 
Senator Al Franken took issue with Facebook’s practice of activating Tag Suggestions by default.9  
Senator Franken was likewise concerned with Facebook’s lack of transparency regarding Tag 
Suggestions: “How can users make an informed decision about facial recognition in their privacy 
settings if you don’t actually tell them that you are using facial recognition?”10 he asked.  Even more 
troubling is that Facebook could not assure the Senate that Facebook would not sell its users’ 
biometric information to third parties in the future, which is also prohibited by the BIPA.  See 740 
                                                 
7  See id. 
8 See https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/facebook_and_facial_recognitio.html (last visited May 12, 
2015). 
9 See http://venturebeat.com/2012/07/18/facebook-hit-with-tough-questions-on-facial-recognition-in-
senate-hearing/ (last visited May 12, 2015). 
10 See id. 
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ILCS 14/15(c).  In an e-mail statement following the hearing, Senator Franken said that he hoped 
Facebook would offer a way for American users to opt in to its photographic database: “I believe 
that we have a fundamental right to privacy, and that means people should have the ability to choose 
whether or not they’ll be enrolled in a commercial facial recognition database.”11 
31. Facebook’s collection, storage and use of its members’ biometric information also 
drew scrutiny from European regulators from countries including Ireland, Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  Indeed, as a result, Facebook was forced to pull Tag Suggestions, promising European 
regulators that it would stop using facial recognition software and delete the data it stored, and also 
promised European regulators that it would not reinstate the feature until it got their approval.  In an 
e-mail statement, Senator Franken said: “I encourage Facebook to provide the same privacy 
protections to its American users as it does its foreign ones.”12 
32. Facebook’s intentional, reckless, or negligent failure to provide its members with 
written notice that their biometric information would be collected, stored and used; to inform 
members the specific time and purpose for which such biometric information would be stored; and to 
obtain its members’ written release for the collection, storage and use of their biometric information, 
violates all three prongs of §15(b) of the BIPA. 
Facebook Fails to Provide a Publicly Available Written Policy 
Regarding the Retention and Destruction of Biometric Information 
33. Facebook does not comply with §15(a) of the BIPA’s requirement to “develop a 
written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for 
permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information.”  740 ILCS 14/15(a). 
                                                 
11 See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/technology/facebook-backs-down-on-face-recognition-in-
europe.html?_r=0 (last visited May 12, 2015). 
12 See id. 
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Plaintiff’s Personal Experiences  
34. Plaintiff is a resident of Chicago, Illinois.  Plaintiff has been a member of Facebook 
since at least 2009.  Since joining Facebook, plaintiff has uploaded and posted many photographs to 
Facebook’s network that include images of his face, and plaintiff has tagged himself in many of 
those photographs.  Plaintiff has also been tagged in photographs by other Facebook users. 
35. Using these manually tagged images of plaintiff, Facebook created a biometric face 
template of plaintiff’s face that Facebook stores and uses without authorization. 
36. Plaintiff did not receive notice that Facebook would collect, store or use his biometric 
information. 
37. Plaintiff never provided informed consent, in writing or otherwise, to Facebook’s 
collection, creation, storage, or use of his face template or any of his biometric information. 
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
38. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure on behalf of the following proposed class (the “Class”): 
All persons who, while residing in Illinois, had their biometric identifiers collected, 
captured, received or otherwise obtained by Facebook. 
39. Subject to additional information obtained through further investigation and 
discovery, the foregoing definition of the Class may be expanded or narrowed by amendment or 
amended complaint. 
40. Specifically excluded from the Class are defendant, its officers, directors, agents, 
trustees, parents, children, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees, principals, servants, 
partners, joint-venturers, or any entities controlled by defendant, and its heirs, successors, assigns, or 
other persons or entities related to or affiliated with defendant and/or its officers and/or directors, the 
judge assigned to this action, and any member of the judge’s immediate family. 
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41. Numerosity.  The members of the Class are so numerous that individual joinder is 
impracticable.  Upon information and belief, plaintiff alleges that the Class contains many thousands 
of members.  Although the precise number of Class members is unknown to plaintiff, the true 
number of Class members is known by defendant, and thus, may be notified of the pendency of this 
action by first class mail, electronic mail and/or published notice. 
42. Existence and predominance of common questions of law and fact.  Common 
questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual Class members.  These common legal and factual questions include, but 
are not limited to, the following: 
(a) whether defendant collected, captured, received, or otherwise obtained 
biometric identifiers or biometric information from plaintiff and the Class; 
(b) whether defendant informed plaintiff and the Class before collecting, using, 
and storing their biometric identifiers or biometric information, as required by §15(b) the BIPA; 
(c) whether defendant informed plaintiff and the Class of the specific purpose and 
length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored and 
used, as required by §15(b) the BIPA; 
(d) whether defendant obtained a written release, as defined by the BIPA, from 
plaintiff and the Class to collect, store, and use their biometric identifiers or biometric information; 
(e) whether defendant used biometric identifiers to identify plaintiff and the 
Class; 
(f) whether defendant provided a publicly available written policy establishing a 
retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometrics 
information, as required by §15(a) of the BIPA;  
Case: 1:15-cv-04265 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/14/15 Page 13 of 20 PageID #:13
 - 12 - 
(g) whether defendant’s violations of the BIPA were committed intentionally, 
recklessly or negligently; 
(h) whether plaintiff and the Class are entitled to statutory damages under the 
BIPA and the correct measure of those damages; and 
(i) whether plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. 
43. Typicality.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the 
Class in that defendant collected, stored and used his biometric information without informed 
consent in the exact same manner as every other Class member. 
44. Adequacy of representation.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the Class.  Plaintiff has retained counsel highly experienced in complex consumer class action 
litigation, and plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action.  Further, plaintiff has no interests 
that are antagonistic to those of the Class. 
45. Superiority.  A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of this controversy.  The damages or other financial detriment suffered by 
individual Class members is relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be 
entailed by individual litigation of their claims against defendant.  It would thus be virtually 
impossible for the Class, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the wrongs committed 
against them.  Furthermore, even if Class members could afford such individualized litigation, the 
court system could not.  Individualized litigation would create the danger of inconsistent or 
contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts.  Individualized litigation would also 
increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system from the issues raised by this 
action.  By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues in a 
single proceeding, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court, and 
presents no unusual management difficulties under the circumstances here. 
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46. The Class may also be certified because: 
(a) the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create 
a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual Class members that would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant; 
(b) the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create 
a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the 
interests of other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede 
their ability to protect their interests; and/or 
(c) defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the 
Class as a whole, thereby making appropriate final declaratory and/or injunctive relief with respect 
to the members of the Class as a whole. 
COUNT I 
Violations of the Illinois Biometric 
Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b) 
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 
47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the 
preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
48. Section 15(b) of the BIPA provides that a private entity may not, among other things, 
collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a 
customer’s biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless it first: 
(l) informs the subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or 
biometric information is being collected or stored; 
(2) informs the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and length of 
term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, 
stored, and used; and 
(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric 
identifier or biometric information . . . . 
740 ILCS 14/15(b). 
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49. Facebook is a private entity under the BIPA.  See 740 ILCS 14/10. 
50. Plaintiff and the Class members are individuals under the BIPA.  See id. 
51. Facebook collected plaintiff’s and the Class members’ “biometric identifiers” through 
its facial recognition software, as alleged above.  See id. 
52. Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ biometric identifiers collected by Facebook 
constitute “biometric information” as defined by the BIPA because Facebook used those biometric 
identifiers to identify plaintiff and the Class members.  See id. 
53. Facebook systematically collected, used, and stored plaintiff’s and the Class 
members’ biometric identifiers and biometric information without first obtaining the written release 
required by §15(b) of the BIPA. 
54. As alleged above, Facebook did not inform plaintiff or the Class members in writing 
that their biometric identifiers or biometric information were being collected, stored and used, as 
required by §15(b) of the BIPA. 
55. As alleged above, Facebook did not inform plaintiff or the Class members in writing 
of the specific purpose and length of term for which their biometric identifiers or biometric 
information was being collected, stored and used, as required by §15(b) of the BIPA. 
56. By collecting, storing, and using plaintiff’s and the Class members’ biometric 
identifiers and biometric information as described herein, Facebook violated plaintiff’s and the Class 
members’ rights to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric information as set forth in the 
BIPA, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. 
57. Facebook’s violations of §15(b) of the BIPA were intentional or reckless because 
Facebook intentionally activated Tag Suggestions by default and without written notice as required 
by the BIPA and, therefore, plaintiff and the Class members had no opportunity to provide defendant 
with a written release, as mandated by the BIPA. 
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58. Alternatively, Facebook’s violations of §15(b) of the BIPA were negligent because 
Facebook failed to meet the applicable standard of care in ensuring that its members were informed 
and consented to the collection, storage, and use of their biometric information and biometric 
identifiers. 
59. As a result of defendant’s violations of §15(b) of the BIPA, plaintiff seeks the 
following relief individually and on behalf of the Class: (l) injunctive and equitable relief pursuant to 
740 ILCS 14/20(4) requiring Facebook to comply with the BIPA’s requirements for the collection, 
storage, and use of biometric identifiers and biometric information as alleged herein; (2) statutory 
damages of $5,000 for each intentional or reckless violation of the BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 
14/20(2), or alternatively, statutory damages of $1,000 per negligent violation of the BIPA pursuant 
to 740 ILCS 14/20(1); and (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS 
14/20(3). 
COUNT II 
Violations of the Illinois Biometric 
Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(a) 
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 
60. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the 
preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
61. Section 15(a) of the BIPA requires: 
A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must 
develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention 
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and 
biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such 
identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last 
interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first. 
740 ILCS 14/15(a). 
62. Facebook does not provide a publicly available retention schedule or guidelines for 
permanently destroying its users’ biometric identifiers and biometric information as required by the 
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BIPA.  Therefore, Facebook has violated §15(a) of the BIPA.  Facebook’s violations of §15(a) of the 
BIPA were intentional or reckless or, alternatively, negligent. 
63. As a result of Facebook’s violations of §15(a) of the BIPA, plaintiff seeks the 
following relief individually and on behalf of the Class: (l) injunctive and equitable relief pursuant to 
740 ILCS 14/20(4) requiring Facebook to comply with §15(a) of the BIPA’s requirement to establish 
and provide a publicly available retention schedule or guidelines for permanently destroying its 
users’ biometric identifiers and biometric information; (2) statutory damages of $5,000 for each 
intentional or reckless violation of §15(a) of the BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2), or 
alternatively, statutory damages of $1,000 per negligent violation of §15(a) of the BIPA pursuant to 
740 ILCS 14/20(1); and (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS 
14/20(3). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for a judgment against defendant as follows: 
A. Certifying the Class as defined above, appointing plaintiff as Class Representative, 
and appointing Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP as Class Counsel; 
B. Declaring that defendant’s actions, as alleged above, violate §15(a) and (b) of the 
BIPA, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq.;  
C. Awarding statutory damages of $5,000 for each intentional or reckless violation of the 
BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2), or alternatively, statutory damages of $1,000 per negligent 
violation of the BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1); 
D. Awarding injunctive and equitable relief pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(4) requiring 
Facebook to comply with the BIPA by providing a publicly available retention schedule or 
guidelines for permanently destroying its users’ biometric identifiers and biometric information and 
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forcing defendant to stop collecting, storing, and using plaintiff’s and the Class members’ biometric 
identifiers and biometric information without first obtaining their informed written consent; 
E. Awarding plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(3); and 
F. Awarding any further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial on all issues so triable. 
DATED:  May 14, 2015 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN 
 & DOWD LLP 
JAMES E. BARZ (IL Bar # 6255605) 
FRANK RICHTER (IL Bar # 6310011) 
 
s/ James E. Barz 
 JAMES E. BARZ 
 
200 South Wacker Drive, 31st Floor 
Chicago, IL  60606 
Telephone:  312/674-4674 
312/674-4676 (fax) 
jbarz@rgrdlaw.com 
 
Local Counsel for Plaintiff 
 
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN 
 & DOWD LLP 
SHAWN A. WILLIAMS 
DAVID W. HALL 
Post Montgomery Center 
One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
Telephone:  415/288-4545 
415/288-4534 (fax) 
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ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN 
 & DOWD LLP 
PAUL J. GELLER 
STUART A. DAVIDSON 
MARK DEARMAN 
CHRISTOPHER C. MARTINS 
120 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 500 
Boca Raton, FL  33432 
Telephone:  561/750-3000 
561/750-3364 (fax) 
 
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN 
 & DOWD LLP 
TRAVIS E. DOWNS III 
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 
San Diego, CA  92101 
Telephone:  619/231-1058 
619/231-7423 (fax) 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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